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Texas v. McCullough, 106 S. Ct. 976 (1986).
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court held in North Carolina v.
PearceI that a presumption of judicial vindictiveness attaches to a
sentence imposed upon reconviction which is longer than the origi-
nal sentence and imposed by the same trial court judge. If vindic-
tiveness and/or retaliation motivates the imposition of a more
severe sentence on reconviction, that sentence is imposed in viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process of law. 2
On appeal, a reviewing court will invalidate the sentence.3 A sen-
tencingjudge may nevertheless rebut a presumption ofjudicial vin-
dictiveness with reasons affirmatively appearing from the record and
based upon the defendant's conduct after the original sentencing
proceeding. 4 A presumption of judicial vindictiveness controls as a
matter of law in the absence of such rebutting evidence.5
Since Pearce, the Court has reexamined the constitutionality of
1 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
2 "No State ... shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I.
3 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723-24. See also Texas v. McCullough, 106 S. Ct. 976 (1986)(a
presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness is inappropriate ifa different sentencing authority
imposed the harsher sentence); Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 (1984)(a pre-
sumption ofjudicial vindictiveness is adequately rebutted by reasons based on an inter-
vening conviction between original sentencing proceeding and new sentence); Chaffin v.
Stynchombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973)(harsher resentencing by a jury is not presumptively
vindictive); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972)(harsher resentencing on trial de
novo does not violate due process of law). Pearce became the first Supreme Court deci-
sion to limit the prerogative of imposing a harsher sentence on retrial, a prerogative
which the Court recognized with no restrictions in Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15
(1919). Some federal circuits had, prior to Pearce, already begun limiting the power to
impose a harsher sentence on reconviction. See, e.g., United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836
(2d Cir. 1968); United States v. White, 382 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1967); Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (Ist Cir.
1967).
4 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
5 See, e.g., Wasman, 468 U.S. at 569-70.
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harsher resentencing under various other circumstances.6 Most re-
cently, in Texas v. McCullough,7 the Court considered whether or not
to presume judicial vindictiveness under Pearce even though a differ-
ent sentencing authority imposed the more severe sentence on re-
conviction.8 The Court held that the imposition of a more severe
sentence by a different sentencing authority on reconviction does
not create a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness 9-a presumption
which imposes a burden upon the sentencing judge to justify the
increased penalty.10 Moreover, because the petitioner in McCullough
failed to otherwise show actual vindictiveness, the Court did not
question the constitutionality of the harsher sentence."I
The Court in McCullough concluded that a more severe sentence
on reconviction does not automatically trigger a presumption ofju-
dicial vindictiveness. 12 Instead, a reviewing court must weigh the
facts of each case to determine whether or not the probability of
judicial vindictiveness warrants such a presumption.' 3 Unless the
facts warrant, the law does not require a trial court judge to justify
an increased sentence. 14
The Pearce Court failed to establish a clear standard for deter-
mining when a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness is appropriate.
The Pearce Court, therefore, left trial court judges inadequately in-
formed of their obligations during resentencing under Pearce.'5
This Note identifies the rough contours of the standard for deter-
mining when a presumption of judicial vindictiveness is applicable.
Next, this Note ascertains the present scope of the Pearce rule' 6 and
6 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
7 106 S. Ct. 976 (1986).
8 In McCullough, the jury fixed the defendant's original sentence; the presiding judge
at the first trial subsequently imposed the more severe sentence on reconviction. McCul-
lough, 106 S. Ct. at 978.
9 Id. at 979-80 ("The facts of this case provide no basis for a presumption of vindic-
tiveness."). See also infra notes 104 & 106 and accompanying text.
10 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
11 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 979. See also Wasman, 468 U.S. at 567-68; United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 384 (1982).
12 E.g., Wasman, 468 U.S. 559 (1984); Chaffin, 412 U.S. 17 (1973) (a harsher sentence
by a jury on reconviction does not deprive a defendant of due process of law); Cotten,
407 U.S. 104 (1972); infra notes 104 & 106 and accompanying text.
13 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
14 In McCullough, Judge Harney set out reasons for imposing the more severe sen-
tence even though the reviewing court subsequently determined that a presumption of
judicial vindictiveness was not in fact warranted. Under Pearce, the sentencing judge
must offer reasons for the enhanced sentence prior to appellate review unless the resen-
tencing judge is absolutely convinced that a presumption is not warranted. Pearce, 395
U.S. at 726.
15 Id. at 982. See also infra notes 73 & 147 and accompanying text.
16 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
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argues that its treatment in McCullough conforms with both prece-
dent and sound public policy. This Note concludes that the Court
in McCullough correctly chose to limit Pearce to those circumstances
in which criminal appellants are most likely to fear judicial
vindictiveness.
II. FACTS
Ajury convicted defendant SanfordJames McCullough of mur-
der,17 and imposed upon him a twenty year prison term.' Presid-
ing Judge Naomi Harney subsequently granted McCullough's
motion for a new trial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. 19
Three months later, with Judge Harney again presiding, a jury
retried and reconvicted McCullough. 20 This time McCullough
elected to have the trial judge fix his sentence.2 1 Judge Harney sen-
tenced McCullough to fifty years in prison and filed findings of fact
as to why a longer sentence on retrial was necessary.22 According to
Judge Harney, new information on retrial implicated McCullough in
the slashing of the victim's throat, and not merely in assisting in the
murder. In addition, the fact that McCullough was released from
prison just four months before the murder in question combined to
warrant an extra thirty-year sentence. 23
On appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated
McCullough's original twenty year sentence. 24 Even though the
court of appeals noted nothing in the record to indicate that vindic-
tiveness motivated the increased punishment, it nonetheless in-
voked the Pearce presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness.2 5 The court
of appeals also considered itself bound by the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Pearce and held that a longer sentence on retrial could be
imposed only if based upon the defendant's conduct occurring after
the original trial.26 According to the court of appeals, Judge Harney
failed to observe the Pearce rule's literal requirements by errone-
ously relying upon events occurring before the original sentencing
17 McCullough v. Texas, 680 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. App. 1983).
Is McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 978.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 McCullough, 680 S.W.2d at 494.
22 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 978.
23 Id.
24 McCullough, 680 S.W.2d at 496.




proceeding to justify the enhanced sentence. 27 Thus, the court con-
cluded that a failure to comply with the Pearce rule was sufficient
grounds for overturning the enhanced sentence, even though the
record failed to "indicate that the increased punishment resulted
from vindictiveness." 28 The United States Supreme Court subse-
quently granted a writ of certiorari to determine whetherJudge Har-
ney's sentence did in fact violate the due process clause.29
III. TEXAS V. MCCULLOUGH
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in McCullough
turned significantly upon an initial determination that judicial vin-
dictiveness could not have played a role in the resentencing pro-
cess.30 Absent a presumption of judicial vindictiveness, the
reviewing court had no obligation to scrutinize Judge Harney's rea-
sons for imposing the more severe sentence on reconviction. 3 1 Ac-
cordingly, the Texas Court of Appeals should have upheld
McCullough's more severe sentence.
1. The Pearce Presumption Does Not Apply
The Court cited several factual reasons why it refused to invoke
the Pearce presumption of judicial vindictiveness in McCullough.
First, Judge Harney agreed with McCullough that a new trial was
necessary. 32 On this basis, the Court concluded that Judge Harney
could not have harbored vindictive or retaliatory motives against
McCullough for initiating his post-conviction proceeding. 33
Second, the Court determined that a purported institutional in-
terest in discouraging meritless appeals3 4 could not have influenced
Judge Harney's decision to impose the more severe sentence upon
27 McCullough, 680 S.W.2d at 496. See also McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 987 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
28 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 978 n.2.
29 Id. at 977.
30 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
31 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
32 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 979.
33 Id. Because McCullough was entitled to choose his sentencer at the time of retrial,
Judge Harney had no way of knowing that she would impose McCullough's subsequent
sentence on reconviction. Judge Harney could not have granted the motion in anticipa-
tion of imposing a harsher sentence upon McCullough.
34 If defendants were immunized from the possibility of receiving a more severe sen-
tence on retrial, they would have nothing to lose and everything to gain by appealing. A
blanket prohibition on harsher resentencing would therefore encourage poor judicial
administration. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 445-46 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting). See
also Comment, Criminal Law--Sentence-On Retrial After Collateral Attack, Imposition of Har-
870 [Vol. 77
1986] REEXAMINING JUDICIAL VINDICTIVENESS 871
McCullough's reconviction. 35 The Court recognized that an "insti-
tutional interest" explanation for the sentence applies to sentencing
in all appellate settings, without regard to the existence of judicial
vindictiveness. 36 The Court feared that "[p]resuming vindictiveness
on this basis alone would be tantamount to presuming that a judge
will be vindictive towards a defendant merely because he seeks an
acquittal."' 37 The Court refused to apply the Pearce rule to circum-
stances in which an argument for the requisite presumption ofjudi-
cial vindictiveness was this speculative and its ramifications this
overreaching.
38
Finally, the Court would not presume judicial vindictiveness if a
different sentencing authority imposed the more severe sentence on
reconviction. 39 The Court noted that a likelihood of vindictiveness
did not exist in McCullough since the original sentencing proceeding
involved a jury,40 not Judge Harney. 41 The trial court nullified the
initial sentence when it overturned McCullough's original convic-
tion.42 Judge Harney, therefore, exercised her sentencing discre-
tion for the first time upon McCullough's reconviction.
The Court required, as a precondition to presuming judicial
vindictiveness, evidence that the resentencing judge personally
fixed the appellant's original sentence. 43 Since the original sentenc-
ing proceeding in McCullough did not personally involve Judge Har-
ney, the Court found no reason to suspect vindictive or retaliatory
motivation for the sentence increase.
44
2. Compliance With the Pearce Rule Requirements
The Court found that even if it had presumed judicial vindic-
tiveness in McCullough, Judge Harney adequately complied with the
Pearce requirements. 45 The Court reached this conclusion, however,
only after rejecting the Pearce rule's literal mandates. 46 The Court
reasoned that strict compliance with the Pearce rule requirements
sher Sentence WithoutJustification, or Denial of Credit for Time Served, Violates Due Process of Law
and Equal Protection Clauses-Patton v. North Carolina, 80 HARV. L. REV. 891, 893 (1967).
35 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 979.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 980.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 978.
41 Id. at 980.
42 Id. at 978. See, e.g., infra note 86.
43 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 978. See also Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
44 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 979-80.
45 Id at 980-81.
46 See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
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could compel "absurd" results and should therefore be avoided
where its purpose would not be served.
47
The Court specifically noted that by limiting reasons for a sen-
tence increase to events occuring after the original sentencing pro-
ceeding, the Pearce rule would systematically preclude a sentencing
authority from considering all relevant information in assessing the
defendant's proper punishment upon reconviction. 48 A more sound
application of the Pearce rule would not preclude a sentencing au-
thority from considering new information related to events prior to
the original sentencing proceeding. 49 In the Court's view, Judge
Harney adequately complied with the Pearce rule when she identi-
fied, for the record, facts relevant to assessing McCullough's punish-
ment which were not available for the jury's consideration in the
original sentencing proceeding. 50
B. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S CONCURRENCE
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan agreed with the ma-
jority that judicial vindictiveness was only remotely possible in Mc-
Cullough.51 Justice Brennan, however, stated that, under Pearce,
Judge Harney's reasons for the sentence increase would have been
inadequate to rebut a presumption of judicial vindictiveness. 52 In
any event, Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that the burden
of establishing judicial vindictiveness in McCullough did not shift to
Judge Harney because the facts failed to compel a Pearce presump-
tion of judicial vindictiveness.
53
C. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, found that the facts in
47 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 981.
Suppose... that a defendant is convicted of burglary, a non-violent, and apparently
first, offense. He is sentenced to a short prison term or perhaps placed on proba-
tion. Following a successful appeal and a conviction on retrial, it is learned that the
defendant has been using an alias and in fact has a long criminal record that in-
cludes other burglaries, several armed robbery convictions, and a conviction for
murder committed in the course of a burglary. None of the reasons underlying
Pearce in any way justifies the perverse result that the defendant receive no greater
sentence in light of this information than he originally received when he was
thought to be a first offender.
Id. (quoting brief of Amicus Curiae at 26). See also Wasman, 468 U.S. at 573 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
48 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 981.
49 See Wasman, 468 U.S. 559, 571-72 (1984).
50 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 982.
51 Id. at 982 (Brennan, J., concurring).
52 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
53 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
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McCullough warranted a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness. 54 He
first noted that the prosecuting attorney and Judge Harney made
post-trial statements indicating their belief that the jury had been
too lenient in sentencing McCullough to twenty years in jail.55 Ac-
cording to Justice Marshall, these statements should have invoked a
presumption of judicial vindictiveness. 56
The prosecutor publicly admitted that he sought a new trial in
anticipation of securing a more severe sentence on reconviction.
57
A local newspaper quoted the prosecutor as commenting, "A guy's
life ought to be worth more than that."58  Likewise, Judge Harney
said that she would have given McCullough a more severe punish-
ment had she sentenced him after the first trial rather than the
jury.59 The dissent noted that these statements should have cast
doubt on the appropriateness ofJudge Harney's reasons for grant-
ing McCullough a new trial.
60
Second, Justice Marshall questioned the propriety of interpret-
ing McCullough's election of Judge Harney as the sentencing au-
thority on retrial, as any indication that McCullough believed in
Judge Harney's fairness. 61 Since McCullough could have chosen
Judge Harney involuntarily, "the fact that McCullough elected to be
sentenced by Judge Harney [may have no] relevance to the question
whether Pearce requires ... [the Court] to presume" that judicial vin-
dictiveness motivated the enhanced sentence. 62 The difficulty of
finding an impartial jury supports this inference.
63
Third, Justice Marshall disputed the majority's findings that ju-
dicial vindictiveness was only remotely possible.64 For instance, the
54 Id. at 983 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 983-84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 986 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 983 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). In this quote, the prosecutor is referring to the vic-
tim's life being worth more than the twenty years McCullough received from the jury.
59 Id. at 984 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(If McCullough "elected to have the Court set
his punishment at the first trial, the court would have assessed more than the (20) year
sentence imposed by the jury.").
60 Id. at 985-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 984-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 984 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 983-84 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See id. at 985 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing)("[D]efendant's choice might have been influenced by a desire to avoid being sen-
tenced by ajury from a community that had been exposed to the considerable publicity
surrounding the first trial."). The Court had, in an earlier case, emphatically rejected
the contention that a jury was capable of vindictive resentencing. Chaffin, 412 U.S. 17
(1973). See also Note, Harsher Resentencing by Juy on Retrial is Permissible: Chaffin v.
Stynchombe, 28 Sw. LJ. 469 (1974).
64 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 985-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
873
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
dissent argued that a sentencing judge may resent a defendant for
requiring the judge to "publicly conced[e]" assignments of error
upon which a motion for a new trial is granted.65 The dissent also
noted that Judge Harney may have weighed the jury's "compara-
tively light sentence" 66 against McCullough. These considerations
could have played a "part in Judge Harney's decision to give McCul-
lough a harsher sentence." 67 Judicial vindictiveness should there-
fore have been presumed.
Fourth, the dissent disagreed with the majority's interpretation
of the Pearce rule. Justice Marshall argued that the Pearce rule's clear
and unequivocal language did not permit a trial court judge, on re-
sentencing, to consider new evidence which did not refer to events
following the first trial. 68 Judge Harney therefore would have mis-
applied the Pearce rule by relying on new evidence limited in proba-
tive worth to events surrounding the murder in question. This
finding sufficiently warranted reinstating McCullough's original sen-
tence, since the new evidence would have been substantively inade-
quate to rebut a presumption of judicial vindictiveness. 69
The dissent further argued that the Court's loose construction
of the Pearce rule needlessly diluted its effectiveness because Judge
Harney relied on additional evidence readily available to a trial
judge on resentencing. 70 Such evidence includes a wide range of
new information, from information pertaining to the defendant's
participation in the offense to information providing new insights
into the defendant's personal life and character.7 1 If a trial judge
resentences a defendant vindictively, the judge could circumvent the
Pearce rule safeguards by referring to such readily accessible evi-
dence in support of the sentence increase.
72
IV. HISTORY: NORTH CAROLINA V. PEARCE
The constitutionality of harsher resentencing has become a
much litigated and often confused field, one that has been marked
by delicate and controversial distinctions.73 Due in part to its un-
65 Id. at 985 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 986 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 987 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71 See id. at 981-82. See also notes 154, 157, 159 & 175 and accompanying text.
72 106 S. Ct. at 986-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pearce to resolve a conflict among the
federal and state courts concerning whether imposing an enhanced sentence on retrial
violated constitutional protections. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 715 n.5 (1969). Compare
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avoidably suspect overtones, harsher resentencing has, since Pearce,
continued to provoke repeated constitutional litigation in all
courts.7 4 These developments reveal that Pearce is predicated on
policies which need reexamination and reclarification. These devel-
opments also necessitate a reexamination of the judicially created
methods for implementing the due process guarantees affirmed in
Pearce.
In North Carolina v. Pearce,75 the Court held that a trial judge
resentencing a criminal defendant on retrial must justify an in-
creased penalty by stating reasons which affirmatively appear from
the record and are based on objective information about the de-
fendant's conduct following the first sentencing proceeding.76 In
the absence of such justification, a reviewing court will sustain a pre-
sumption ofjudicial vindictiveness where properly warranted. 77 In
Pearce, fourJustices concurred in the Court's judgment, and the en-
tire Court unanimously concluded that vindictive resentencing vio-
lates the due process of law.78 Since the trial court judge in Pearce
Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583, 585 (1st Cir. 1985) (defendant should not have to
fear possibility that exercise of right of appeal will result in penalty in form of higher
sentence) with Newman v. Rodgriguez, 375 F.2d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1967)(risk of incur-
ring greater prison term after retrial is risk defendant takes when defendant chooses to
appeal)(citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)) and United States v. Russell, 378 F.2d
808, 811-12 (3d Cir. 1967)(trial judge may impose sentence greater than original with-
out violating due process protection).
74 See infra notes 104, 106 & 147 and accompanying text.
75 395 U.S. 711 (1969). In Pearce, the trial court convicted and sentenced Pearce to a
twelve to fifteen year prison term. Id. at 713. Pearce subsequently initiated post-convic-
tion proceedings and the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed his conviction.
Pearce v. North Carolina, 226 N.C. 234, 145 S.E.2d 918 (1966).
On retrial, the same judge reconvicted and sentenced Pearce to an eight year prison
term. The prison term, combined with the time he had already served in confinement,
amounted to a longer sentence than was originally imposed. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 713 n.1.
The record failed to disclose any reason for the increased sentence. Id. at 726.
Pearce thereafter appealed to the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of North Carolina for writ of habeas corpus. The district court, relying primarily
upon the authority of Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905
(1968), held the harsher sentence void and unconstitutional. Having failed to resen-
tence Pearce within sixty days, the district court ordered his release. The United States
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari. 393 U.S. 922 (1968).
76 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
77 See, e.g., infra notes 138 & 146.
78 In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas, with whom Justice Marshall joined, ar-
gued that the double jeopardy clause did not permit a "State because of prior error, to
have a second chance to obtain an enlarged sentence." Pearce, 395 U.S. at 731 (Douglas,
J., concurring) (footnote omitted);Justice Black concurred in the majority's opinion that
vindictive sentencing violates due process of law. Id. at 737 (Black, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Black, however, qualified his concurrence by stating that Pearce was not in fact a case
in which the trial court judge resentenced the defendant vindictively. Id. at 740 (Black,
J., concurring). Justice Harlan also agreed that vindictive sentencing had no place in the
875
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failed to rebut a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness, the Supreme
Court ordered the district court to reinstate Pearce's original
sentence.
79
The Pearce Court, however, summarily rejected the defendant's
equal protection80 and double jeopardy claims.8 1 The Court rea-
soned that the double jeopardy clause does not prohibit imposing
an otherwise "lawful single punishment" upon reconviction.8 2 A
corollary to the court's power to retry a defendant is the power to
impose whatever sentence may be legally authorized should the de-
fendant be reconvicted.8 3 The Court accordingly held that the
double jeopardy clause does not limit the severity of the sentence
imposed upon reconviction.8
4
The Pearce Court also determined that the imposition of an in-
creased sentence upon reconviction does not discriminate against
defendants who succeed in getting their conviction set aside merely
because "convicts who do not seek new trials cannot have their
sentences increased." 85 The Court found this conclusion entirely
consistent with the fact that new sentences are being imposed upon
reconviction and not additional sentences.
8 6
law. Id. at 745 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan, however, did not agree with the
Court's interpretation of the double jeopardy clause and argued that the clause protects
potential appellants from fear of being "placed injeopardy of suffering the greater pun-
ishment not imposed at the first trial." Id. at 749-50 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice
White also concurred in the Court's opinion with one exception. In Justice White's
view, the Pearce rule should have authorized "an increased sentence on retrial based on
any objective, identifiable factual data not known to the trial judge at the time of the
original sentencing proceeding." Id. at 751 (White, J., concurring).
79 395 U.S. at 726.
80 "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The argument here is that equal protection
is denied because successful appellants are the only defendants whose sentence could be
increased.
81 "[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. This clause was made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
82 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721.
83 Id. at 720; see also United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964); Forman v. United
States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
84 See also United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940, 948 (3d Cir. 1981)(Nothing in the
history or policy of the double jeopardy clause "suggests that its purpose included pro-
tecting the finality of a sentence and thereby barring resentencing to correct a sentence
entered illegally or erroneously."); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896)(double
jeopardy prohibition was not against twice being punished, but against being twice put
in jeopardy; therefore, retrial for the same offense did not put one in jeopardy); Kuvaas
v. Alaska, 717 P.2d 855 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986)(enhanced sentence imposed did not
violate prohibition against double jeopardy or defendant's due process rights).
85 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 722.
86 Id. See also id. at 721 ("[TIhe original conviction has, at the defendant's behest,
been wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean.").
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The Court reasoned that if a criminal defendant successfully
obtains a new trial, he has implicitly acquiesced in the court's con-
comitant power to impose upon him a new sentence befitting the
court's independent assessment of the crime.8 7 The defendant may
be acquitted on retrial. If reconvicted, he may receive a new sen-
tence that is less than, equal to, or greater in severity than his origi-
nal sentence.
88
The Court, nevertheless, recognized that procedural safe-
guards 9 were necessary to prevent state and federal appellate
courts from "follow[ing] an announced practice of imposing a heav-
ier sentence upon every reconvicted defendant for the explicit pur-
pose of punishing the defendant." 90 The Pearce Court held that this
practice violated the due process of law guaranteed by the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. 9 1 As a preventive measure, the Court
mandated a factual justification requirement for heavier sentencing
on reconviction.
92
The Court created this justification requirement in order to free
defendants from fear, real or imagined, that a sentencing judge
might punish them for initiating and subsequently succeeding in
their post-conviction proceeding.93 The Pearce Court stated this rule
as:
87 Id. at 720. See also Tateo, 377 U.S. at 466:
Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the societal inter-
est in punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has obtained such a trial. It would
be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from
punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the pro-
ceedings leading to conviction.
88 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721. See also Justice Black's concurring opinion in Pearce, 395
U.S. at 738 (Black,J., concurring)("[D]efendants are not denied equal protection when
the state makes no provision for re-evaluation of sentences generally but permits the
penalty set after retrials to be whatever penalty the trial judge finds to be appropriate,
whether it be higher or lower than the sentence originally set.").
89 These limitations do not proscribe the length of a sentence imposed upon recon-
viction; rather these limitations condition the manner in which sentencing discretion is
exercised. See Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969)("Due process of law requires that vindic-
tiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his conviction must play no
part in the sentence he receives .... ")(emphasis added).
90 Id. at 723.
91 Id. See also United States v. Lundien, 769 F.2d 981, 986-87 4th Cir. 1985):
Although the parameters of due process to be accorded at sentencing are not firmly
fixed, it is beyond doubt that a sentence enhanced whether before or after com-
mencement of service, because of vindictiveness or other plainly improper motive
of the trial court would be fundamentally unfair and would deny the defendant due
process.
Pearce also marks the first time that the Court has, in any case not involving a depri-
vation of equal protection of the laws, held unconstitutional a burden on a state right of
appeal.
92 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
93 Id. at 725.
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[W]henever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a de-
fendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirma-
tively appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective
information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defend-
ant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.
And the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must
be made part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the
increased sentence may be fully reviewable on appeal.
9 4
Since the rule prohibits a sentencing authority from punishing a
defendant for successfully overturning his original conviction,9 5 the
rule should apply to harsher resentencing in all appellate settings.
9 6
The Court in McCullough, however, limited the rule's application to
those sentencing proceedings in which a presumption of judicial
vindictiveness is reasonably warranted. 9 7 If the circumstances lead-
ing up to the new sentencing proceeding fail to provide potential
grounds for judicial vindictiveness, the resentencing authority is
under no obligation to justify the imposition of a more severe sen-
tence on reconviction. 98
V. ANALYSIS
A. WHEN DOES THE PEARCE PRESUMPTION APPLY?
Whether a presumption of judicial vindictiveness applies in a
particular case depends on the factual context in which the more
severe sentence is imposed.9 9 Consequently, the facts upon which
the Court in McCullough relied to justify withholding a presumption
of judicial vindictiveness shed greater light on the parameters of
Pearce. 
10 0
The facts in Pearce adequately compelled a presumption ofjudi-
cial vindictiveness. Since Pearce, however, there have been several
cases in which the circumstances failed to raise such a presumption,
even though the defendant received a more severe sentence on re-
conviction.1 0 ' The Court refused to invoke the Pearce presumption
94 Id. at 726.
95 Id. at 725-26.
96 See, e.g., McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 983-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97 See infra notes 104 & 106 and accompanying text.
98 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 979.
99 See supra note I 1 and infra note 106 and accompanying text for contexts in which
the presumption is inapplicable.
100 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 982 ("It is appropriate that we clarify the scope and'
thrust of Pearce, and we do so here."). See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
101 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. See also Wasman, 468 U.S. at 565 ("In
only one other circumstance [Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974)] has the Court
identified a need to indulge a presumption of vindictiveness of the kind imposed in
Pearce."); infra note 104 and accompanying text.
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of judicial vindictiveness in these cases because its likelihood was
not as pronounced as it was in Pearce.
10 2
An enhanced sentence on reconviction may not always raise a
presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness.1 0 3 Instead, only a natural in-
ference ofjudicial vindictiveness will activate the presumption. As a
threshold requirement, the circumstances must demonstrate either
actual vindictiveness or a realistic fear of vindictiveness. 0 4 In Mc-
Cullough, the Court feared that a less conservative application of the
Pearce presumption would obstruct a legitimate response to criminal
conduct. 0 5 Accordingly, the Court required a rational connection
between the basic facts and the presumed facts in order for a pre-
sumption ofjudicial vindictiveness to pass muster; a mere opportunity
for vindictiveness was considered insufficient to warrant a Pearce
presumption. 10
6
1. When To Presume Vindictiveness
A presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness is predicated upon the
assumption that the original sentencing judge, if reversed, might
102 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. See also Wasman, 468 U.S. at 566-69.
103 See infra note 106 and accompanying text. See also McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 979.
104 See id. at 979.
The Pearce requirements ... do not apply in every case where a convicted defendant
receives a higher sentence on retrial.... [W]e have restricted application of Pearce
to areas where "its objectives are thought to be most efficaciously served," Stone'v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 487 (1976). Accordingly, in each case, we look to the need,
under the circumstances, to "guard against vindictiveness in the resentencing
process."
See also United States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1986)(legitimate concern
that subsequent prosecution might deter potential appellants from exercising their con-
stitutional rights exists only if vindictiveness is a strong possibility); id. at 688 ("In vin-
dictive prosecution ... both actual vindictiveness and the presumption of vindictiveness
play seperate and distinct roles .... In this circuit, we have applied the presumption of
vindictiveness when it reflects the very real likelihood of actual vindictiveness."); United
States v. Lippert, 740 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681
F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1982).
105 See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373 (1982).
106 Although Judge Harney's knowledge of the severity of the original sentence gave
her an opportunity to impose a more severe sentence on reconviction, knowledge alone
does not establish a sufficient basis for a presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness. See, e.g.,
Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373 ("Given the severity of [presuming judicial vindictiveness] ...
the Court has done so only in cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness
exists."); Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 26-27 (Pearce prohylactic rule does not apply when a jury
imposes the more severe sentence on reconviction. The Court found that the possibility
of vindictiveness was de minimis when resentencing was by a jury in a properly con-
trolled retrial.); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 119 (1973)(opportunity for vindic-
tiveness is insufficient to justify application of the Pearce rule where a higher sentence is
imposed after a trial de novo in those jurisdictions that employ a two-tier trial court
system). See also supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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impose on the defendant a more severe sentence on reconviction. 107
The possibility of such vindictive resentencing impermissibly deters
defendants from exercising their right of appeal.10 8 Consequently,
if the resentencing judge also imposed the defendant's original sen-
tence, the probability of actual vindictiveness on the part of the
judge is high enough to impose upon him the burden of justifying
the higher sentence following reconviction. 10 9
If the sentencing authority differs on retrial, however, the de-
fendant will not be entitled to a presumption of judicial vindictive-
ness. 110 To be entitled to a presumption of judicial vindictiveness
under these circumstances, the defendant must convince the review-
ing court that conferring unguarded sentencing discretion upon a
judge who will sentence the defendant for the first time on retrial
creates an actual risk of vindictiveness. Only then should harsher
resentencing by a different sentencing authority fall under judicial
scrutiny as a means of adequately implementing the due process
guarantee. 111
The majority in McCullough correctly determined that a threat of
vindictiveness does not exist when the sentencing authority differs
on retrial.'1 2 If the resentencing authority differs from the initial
sentencer, the resentencing authority has no personal stake in the
original sentencing proceeding and thus no incumbant stimulus for
retaliation.' 1 3 As a general rule, if a sentencing judge invokes his or
her sentencing discretion for the first time on retrial, as did Judge
Harney, the imposition of a more severe sentence on reconviction
will not give rise to a Pearce presumption of judicial
vindictiveness. 1
1 4
A presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness is also inappropriate if
the "would be" resentencing judge, who did not participate in the
107 Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
108 The deterrent is the fear that the defendant might receive a harsher sentence, es-
pecially if the harsher sentence is imposed solely because the defendant chose to appeal.
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724-25. See also McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 986-87 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
109 Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
110 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 980. See also United States v. Lippert, 740 F.2d 457 (6th
Cir. 1980).
111 The defendant alleging judicial vindictiveness must satisfy this burden in the ab-
sence of a prior judicial determination that the particular fact situation raises a presump-
tion of judicial vindictiveness. See McCullough, 106 S. Ct. 979 (1986).
112 Id. at 980.
113 Id. See also Chaffin, 412 U.S. 17 (1973)(the jury, unlike the judge who has been
reversed, will have no personal stake in the prior conviction and no motivation to en-
gage in self-vindication).
114 See McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 979-80.
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original sentencing proceeding, voluntarily orders a new trial on the
defendant's behalf." 15 Voluntarily ordering a new trial is insufficient
grounds for presuming judicial vindictiveness. To constitute suffi-
cient grounds, the resentencingjudge must at least be assured of an
opportunity to resentence the defendant. In actuality, no such as-
surance exists. Instead, by ordering a new trial, the sentencing
judge goes on record in support of the appeal and is therefore re-
moved from any criticism an appellate court might otherwise direct
towards the judge for the manner in which he or she conducted the
original trial. 16 Accordingly, the trial court judge suffers no per-
sonal rebuke and, thus, has no reason to engage in the type of retali-
atory sentencing on retrial presumed in Pearce.'
17
Furthermore, if a trial court judge voluntarily orders a new trial,
he or she is attesting to the merit of the appeal. 1 8 As a result, the
Court in McCullough properly determined that an institutional inter-
est in discouraging criminal defendants from appealing could not
have motivated the more severe sentence on retrial."19
The facts in McCullough indicate that the defendant could have
feared the possibility of receiving a more severe sentence on recon-
viction andJudge Harney's post-trial statements could have fostered
this fear. 120 Despite their questionable nature, however, these state-
ments could hardly have constituted a natural pretext to vindictive
resentencing.' 2 1 Pearce did not seek to eradicate fear of an enhanced
sentence. 122 Rather, Pearce meant to overcome the evil of judicial
retribution. 123
Members of the McCullough Court agreed that a presumption of
judicial vindictiveness requires a more severe sentence on reconvic-
tion. 124 Vindictiveness, however, does not always inhere in a more
115 Id. at 979.
116 Id.
117 See, e.g., supra note 113.
118 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 979.
119 Id.
120 See id. at 983-84.
121 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)(due process is not implicated
when prosecutor threatens to seek a conviction of defendant on a greater offense with
greater penalty if defendant does not plead guilty); Longval v. Meachum, 651 F.2d 818,
820-21 (1st Cir. 1981).
122 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 979. See also Wasman, 468 U.S. at 568; People v. Atkison,
125 Mich. App. 516, 336 N.W.2d 41 (1983).
123 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725-26; McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 979.
124 The fact that a more severe sentence on reconviction can at most raise a rebuttable
presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness, not a conclusive presumption, compels this con-
clusion. McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 986 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also State v. Lopez,
99 N.M. 612, 613, 661 P.2d 890, 891 (1983)(presumption ofjudicial vindictiveness was
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severe sentence. 125 Without some factual context or chronology of
events from which one can reasonably infer a vindictive motive,
neither an enhanced sentence on reconviction, nor a statement re-
flecting one's opinion that a more severe sentence should have been
imposed initially, 126 will sufficiently compel a presumption of judi-
cial vindictiveness.
127
2. When Does the Pearce Presumption Apply?: Summary
The Court in McCullough revealed two factual conditions which
sufficiently counteract a presumption of judicial vindictiveness.
128
As such, McCullough is the first Supreme Court case to clarify the
proper thrust and scope of Pearce.'29 First, a reviewing court will not
presume judicial vindictiveness if a different sentencing authority
imposes a more severe sentence on retrial. Second, a presumption
ofjudicial vindictiveness is inappropriate if the trial court judge con-
ducting the first trial voluntarily orders a new trial. Either of these
exceptions will, in any case in which a criminal appellant receives an
enhanced sentence on reconviction, make appellate review of the
enhanced sentence unnecessary.
B. THE PEARCE PRESUMPTION: ITS PROPER APPLICATION
Since the trial judge in Pearce failed to set forth any reasons for
imposing the heavier sentence on reconviction, 130 the Court in
Pearce found it unnecessary to explore the type of conduct that
might otherwise justify a higher sentence under the Pearce rule.
Since Pearce, however, the Court has had to reclarify the rule's
proper scope and application.' 3 ' The construction the Court gave
the rule in McCullough reaffirms the Court's earlier construction of
the rule in Wasman v. United States 13 2 and promotes society's interest
in punishing guilty defendants.
inappropriate where total term of imprisonment subsequently ordered on reconviction
was less than defendant's original sentence).
125 See supra note 124. See also McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 979.
126 See, e.g., McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 976; Judge Harney's candid opinion regarding
the inadequacy of the initial sentence does not taint her compentency as a sentencing
authority on retrial. There is no authority for the proposition that a trial court judge's
statements, made in the aftermath of a trial, are grounds for nullifying a sentence subse-
quently imposed upon reconviction.
127 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
128 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 979-80.
129 See supra notes 12, 104 & 106 and accompanying text for a discussion of other
contexts in which the Pearce rule would be applicable.
130 395 U.S. at 726.
131 See McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 982.
132 468 U.S. 559 (1984).
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In order to protect successful appellants from a threat of retri-
bution for appealing, the Pearce Court stipulated that a resentencing
judge must set forth legitimate reasons for increasing a sentence on
retrial.' 33 These reasons must be based "upon objective informa-
tion concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant
occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding."' 134
The dissent in McCullough disagreed with the Court's reasons for ex-
panding the scope of information upon which a trial court judge
might rely to justify increasing a sentence upon reconviction beyond
the Pearce rule's literal confines.
The trial court judge carries the burden of rebutting a pre-
sumption ofjudicial vindictiveness whenever it is warranted. 135 If a
presumption arises, the law requires the trial court judge to comply
with both the procedural and substantive aspects of the Pearce
rule.'3 6 Failure to comply with either one of these requirements will
sustain the presumption and invalidate the sentence. 137
Procedurally, the Pearce rule requires a resentencing judge to
substantiate an increased penalty with objective reasons. These rea-
sons must affirmatively appear from the record and must be based
upon new information acquired since the original sentencing pro-
ceeding.13 8 Substantively, the new information must be compelling
enough to rebut a presumption of judicial vindictiveness. 139 The
information relied upon must convince the reviewing court that a
rational connection exists between the new information introduced
on retrial and the increase in punishment. 140 Introduction of new
information alone will not overcome the presumption. 141
The dissent in McCullough reasoned that a court could easily cir-
cumvent the rule's prohibitions on retrial if the court was given an
opportunity to justify an increased sentence on the basis of new in-
133 395 U.S. at 726.
134 Id.
135 For instance, the facts in Pearce represent the predominant situation in which the
presumption is always warranted-the imposition of a more severe sentence on recon-
viction by the trial court judge who imposed the defendant's original sentence. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711 (1969).
136 Id at 726.
137 See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
138 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
'39 See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 581 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1978)(the defendant's
period of employment and his pending divorce did not indicate reprehensible conduct
and therefore did notjustfy the higher sentence); United States v. Lopez, 428 F.2d 1135
(2d Cir. 1970)(the fact that defendant had legitimately acquired additional financial as-
sets during the intervening period was held not to justify raising the level of his fine).
140 See, e.g., supra note 106 and infra note 159 and accompanying text.
141 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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formation concerning the defendant's participation in the of-
fense.1 42 Since Judge Harney relied upon new information easily
available on resentencing, the Pearce rule could amount to a formal
safeguard without substantive effect.143 The dissent in McCullough
accordingly asserted that requiring an on-the-record rationale for
increasing the sentence will become only a perfunctory procedural
necessity. 1
44
1. Clarifying the Appropriate Scope of the Pearce Rule
The Court exposed and overcame the Pearce rule's potential in-
flexibility for the first time in Wasman v. United States.145 In Wasman,
the Court held that after retrial and conviction following a defend-
ant's succesful appeal, a trial court judge may justify an increased
sentence by affirmatively identifying relevant conduct or events that
occurred subsequent to the original sentencing proceeding. 146 The
Court in Wasman disregarded the rule's limitations and expanded
the scope of information upon which a trial court judge could ap-
propriately rely to justify an increased penalty under Pearce.147
142 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 987 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
144 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
145 468 U.S. 559 (1984).
146 Wasman, 468 U.S. 559 (1984). In Wasman, the sentencing judge relied upon an
intervening conviction for acts committed prior to the original sentencing proceeding to
justify the enhanced sentence.
147 As the McCullough Court stated, "[W]e are not reluctant to tailor judicially-created
rules when the need arises." 106 S. Ct. at 981 n.4. See also Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S.
47, 51 (1973).
Prior to Wasman, the federal and state courts had reached different conclusions on
the question whether conduct supporting an enhanced sentence must have occurred
after the original sentencing proceeding to meet the Pearce test. The period following
Pearce was marked by confusion and inconsistent results. See Robinson v. Scully, 690
F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1982) (new information exposing defendant's greater culpability will
not support harsher sentence if information relates to activities predating original sen-
tencing proceeding); United States v. Williams, 651 F.2d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1981)(court
reversed enhanced sentence on grounds that intervening conviction based on activities
occurring before original sentencing proceeding were not valid bases for sentence en-
hancement under the Pearce rule); United States v. Markus, 603 F.2d 409, 414 (2d Cir.
1979)(intervening conviction based on indictment pending at time of the original sen-
tencing fails to satisfy the Pearce rule); Briggs v. State, 289 Md. 23, 421 A.2d 1369
(1980)(the sentencing judge is precluded from considering interim convictions of de-
fendant based on misbehavior occurring before original sentence). But see United States
v. Wasman, 700 F.2d 663, 670 (11 th Cir. 1983), aff'd, Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S.
559 (1984) (intervening conviction for conduct predating original sentencing proceeding
sufficient conduct to justify enhanced sentence under Pearce). See also United States v.
Kienlen, 415 F.2d 557, 559-60 (10th Cir. 1969)(court held that testimony of the defend-
ant's wife, mother, and witnesses indicating "brutal nature" of defendant sufficiently
justified increasing the sentence); People v. Burnette, 45 Ill. 2d 227, 239, 258 N.E.2d
793, 799 (1970), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 947 (197 1)(court held that defendant's
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Having deliberately avoided the Pearce limitations,' 48 the Court
in McCullough implicitly prioritized the state's interest in punishing
guilty defendants to the fullest extent of the law. The Court's con-
tinuing attempt to justify increased penalties on reconviction, prop-
erly warranted but otherwise imposed in violation of the express
language of the Pearce rule, 14 9 amply justified tempering the rule's
exacting standards. Prioritizing the societal interest in this manner,
however, did not require the Court to jeopardize the effectiveness of
the Pearce rule,' 50 nor compromise its commitment to safeguarding
the due process rights of convicted defendants.' 5 ' Instead, the
Court's reasons set forth in McCullough for relaxing the confines of
the rule were entirely consistent with the reasons given in Wasman
for the Court's earlier construction of the rule.1
5 2
Judges need wide sentencing discretion on retrial as much as
they do in assessing punishment after the first trial. In both cases, a
sentencing authority must consider all information relevant to as-
sessing the severity of the defendant's punishment.5 3 The resen-
tencing judge, with the latest information, can take a fresh look at
testimony was sufficient conduct under Pearce to justify enhanced sentence since testi-
mony revealed details of the crime); Note, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term: Limitations on
Sentencing After Reconviction-In North Carolina v. Pearce, 83 HAiv. L. REv. 187, 190
(1968).
148 See McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 982. The Court in McCullough upheld the reasons
Judge Harney offered in support of the sentence she imposed upon McCullough's re-
conviction. Judge Harney relied upon new information about the murder to justify the
sentence increase. At trial, the state introduced the testimony of two witnesses who had
not testified at the first trial. The new evidence revealed that McCullough, rather than
his accomplices, slashed the victim's throat. According to Judge Harney, the testimony
of the two new witnesses strengthened the state's case on both the guilt and punishment
phases of the trial. Judge Harney also learned at the retrial that McCullough had been
released from prison only four months before the murder. See also Pearce, 395 U.S. at
751 (White, J., concurring). Justice White's concurrence in Pearce emphasized the harsh
limitation the rule placed on the kind of information that could support an enhanced
sentence. If the Court in Pearce had intended information other than that pertaining to
defendant's conduct occurring after the original sentencing proceeding to be an accept-
able basis for an enhanced sentence, Justice White's partial concurrence would not have
been necessary. Justice White's version of the rule, however, was ostensibly the stan-
dard adopted by the Court in Wasman and McCullough.
149 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
150 Id.
151 See, e.g., McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 979 (Court's opinion should not be construed as
requiring more than a restriction upon the application of Pearce to areas where its
"objectives are thought most efficaciously served.") (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 487 (1976)).
152 See, e.g., Wasman, 468 U.S. at 571-72. Note that the judgment in Wasman received
the vote of the entire Court.
153 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978); McClain v. United States, 527 F.Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v.
Mitchell, 377 F.Supp. 1312 (D.D.C. 1974).
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the defendant's character at retrial and make a more informed deci-
sion regarding his sentence. 154 A court's ability to consider a wide
range of information ensures that the sentence suits both the crime
and the criminal.155
The dissent mistakenly implied that such wide sentencing dis-
cretion leads to but one result: a more severe sentence on reconvic-
tion.1 56 On the contrary, wide sentencing discretion is an important
means of providing a potential appellant with the opportunity on
retrial to reduce his sentence or establish his innocence on the basis
of new information.1
57
2. The Preferred Construction of the Pearce Rule
A flexible construction of the Pearce rule would allow a sentenc-
ing authority to consider events and conduct occurring before as
well as after the original sentencing proceeding. 58 Giving the
Pearce rule an otherwise literalist effect will systematically foreclose a
sentencing authority from considering a breadth of new information
that could materially influence the degree of punishment for a
reconvicted defendant. 59 Withholding such relevant information
154 Congress has mandated that judges shall have available the fullest information
possible for consideration in the presentencing investigation to aid judges in their task
of imposing the appropriate sentence on each offender. Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3351-52 (1976). Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the report may contain prior criminal history of the defendant, as well as information
bearing on the defendant's financial status, personal character, circumstances affecting
his behavior, and other information as required by the court. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2).
155 See infra note 175.
156 See, e.g., McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 988 (MarshallJ., dissenting) ("[P]ermitting refer-
ence to new.., information about the crime charged ... nullifies the guarantee [against
judicial vindictiveness] held out in Pearce.").
157 See, e.g., Pearce, 395 U.S at 721. See also infra notes 166, 169 & 179; Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 249 (1949) (Increasing discretionary powers of sentencing judges is
based on "belief that by careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted offend-
ers many could be less severely punished and restored sooner to complete freedom and
useful citizenship.").
158 See, e.g., Wasman, 468 U.S. at 571-72. See also id. at 573 (Powell, J., concur-
ring)(quoting United States v. Wasman, 700 F.2d at 667)(limiting new information to
events, and thereby excluding conduct, would "exalt words above substance.").
159 See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, Hayes
v. United States, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982)(where evidence excluded at first trial showed that
defendant had attempted to cover up his criminal involvement, a higher sentence was
allowed; a literal application of Pearce's reference to subsequent conduct is unnecessary
where judge's reasons clearly negated any suggestion of vindictiveness); Robinson v.
Scully, 690 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1982)(suggesting that the key may be what was known to the
court at time of the original sentencing proceedings). See also Tucker v. United States,
581 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1978)(Wood, J., concurring). One commentator has sug-
gested that
[t]he danger in adopting an inflexible rule is that the court in which the successful
appellant is being retried will be unable to compensate for undue leniency which
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from the person in whom the sentencing authority is vested will ob-
struct unnecessarily the duties of the trial court judge in assessing a
defendant's proper punishment.'
60
Pearce stipulates that a trial court judge, from whom a defendant
received his initial sentence, is presumed to have acted vindictively if
the judge imposed a more severe sentence on the defendant without
the aid of new information reasonably competent to justify the sen-
tence increase.' 61 Under Pearce, such new information is limited to
the defendant's conduct after the original sentencing proceeding.
162
There is, however, no reason why these conditions should arbi-
trarily preclude a trial court judge from generally considering new
information upon resentencing. 163 Events occurring prior to the
original sentencing proceeding can legitimately constitute accepta-
ble new information having a significant bearing on the proper de-
gree of punishment to be assessed. 64 The need to broadly construe
the Pearce rule is also greatest whenever the new information be-
comes crucial to a disposition of the case.'
65
Similarly, when the trial record reveals new information about
the defendant and his criminal activity which reasonably justifies a
sentence enhancement, a presumption of vindictiveness should be
deemed adequately rebutted.1 66 An appellate court should uphold
the harsher sentence if it can objectively conclude, on the basis of
new information, that the harsher sentence actually imposed reflects
reasoned sentencing discretion.1 67 If the state satifies a reviewing
court that such a possibility exists, reasonable doubts about the
existence ofjudicial vindictiveness should be resolved in favor of the
sentencing judge. 68
may have been shown by the first sentencing judge or to adjust a sentence on the
basis of a rational evaluation of factors which were not available to the first judge.
Note, Retrial of the Successful Criminal Appellant: Harsher Punishment and Denial of Credit for
Time Served, 28 MD. L. REv. 64, 74 (1968).
160 See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
162 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
163 See Wasman, 468 U.S. at 573 (Powell, J., concurring).
164 See supra note 175. Moreover, these reasons must still affirmatively appear from
the record. Consequently, the rule would not stand as an invitation to vindictive judges
who might otherwise order a thorough investigation into the defendant's life in search
of reasons to justify an enhanced sentence.
165 See supra note 47.
166 Deference to trial court sentencing discrction is as imperative to efficient judicial
administration as it is to maintaining the limited role of the appellate courts. Appellate
courts should therefore show faith and trust in the judicial discretion of the trial courts.
See Russell, 378 F.2d at 812. See also infra note 170.
167 See supra note 166.
168 An appellate court, in its limited role, should not overturn the findings of the trial
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Moreover, to argue that a reviewing court will be in the untena-
ble position of trying to determine if new information constitutes
grounds for the harsher sentence, or simply a facade for improper
motivations, mistakes the appropriate extent of the inquiry under
Pearce.169 Pearce and its progeny say nothing about requiring a re-
viewing court to question a trial court judge's motivation for impos-
ing an enhanced sentence on reconviction if new information
reasonably and objectively qualifies the sentence increase. For a re-
viewing court to indulge in speculation beyond the limits set forth in
Pearce is neither necessary nor proper. 170
A trial court judge may rely upon new information related to
conduct prior to the original sentencing proceeding to assess a de-
fendant's guilt on retrial. 171 If resentencing is consistent with the
double jeopardy clause,172 similar information should aid resentenc-
ing. 173 Unnecessarily restricting the type of information relevant to
assessing punishment on reconviction, and not limiting in a corre-
sponding fashion similar information in assessing guilt on retrial,
will invariably lead to new sentences which are artificial and arbitrar-
ily manufactured. 174 Contrary to sound policy and settled principles
of criminal law, the new sentence will neither reflect the severity of
the crime nor fit the defendant's potential for rehabilitation. 175
Furthermore, a flexible rule will still satisfy the due process re-
quirements if the reasons for the sentence increase persuade a re-
viewing court that there was a sound, non-vindictive basis for the
court judge unless clearly erroneous or otherwise a product of actual vindictiveness. See,
e.g., Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74
YALE L.J. 606 (1965). See also supra note 166.
169 See, e.g., Wasman, 468 U.S. at 572 (limiting type of factual information upon which
to justify an increased penalty is not desirable; appellate court's principle concern is in
enabling trial court judges access to relevant sentencing information).
170 See Note, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term: Limitations on Sentencing After Reconviction-
North Carolina v. Pearce, 83 HARV. L. REV. 187, 190 (1969)("Sentencing has tradition-
ally been a judicial black box, a realm ruled by trial court discretion insulated from ap-
pellate review. The shielding of sentencing from the normal adversary process is based
in part on various arguments that each sentencing decision is unique and not susceptible
to governance by specifiable standards.").
171 Because the slate is wiped clean, there is at least conceptually no new or old infor-
mation on retrial. Moreover, reconvicting a defendant will never by itself raise a pre-
sumption ofjudicial vindictiveness. Accordingly, the safeguards applicable to assessing
punishment on reconviction are inapplicable to determining guilt on retrial.
172 See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 719-21.
173 See supra notes 84 & 86.
174 See supra note 87 and infra note 175.
175 A state may adopt the "prevalent modern philosophy of penology that the punish-
ment should fit the offender and not merely the crime." Williams, 337 U.S. 241, 247
(1949). See also supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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sentence.' 76 Even without limiting the type and extent of informa-
tion which may be considered in assessing punishment on retrial,
appellate courts retain the ultimate authority to determine whether
or not the trial court judge adequately justified the sentence in-
crease. 177 Appellate review of resentencing decisions is further as-
surance that a non-vindictive rationale supports the increase.
Even if the need for a stricter application of the Pearce rule safe-
guards was clear, the question would remain whether the incremen-
tal benefit would justify the cost. 178 Employing this balancing test
reveals that it is impossible to safeguard against judicial vindictive-
ness in every conceivable circumstance without inflicting adverse
repercussions on the underlying policies of the criminal justice sys-
tem.179 In the end, rigid guidelines, despite their noble intentions,
suffocate an otherwise legitimate exercise of sentencing discretion
without providing corresponding assurance that vindictive resen-
tencing is any less probable. 180
3. The Preferred Construction of the Pearce Rule: Summary
The Pearce rule should be construed only to require a sentenc-
ing authority to articulate its reasons for increasing a defendant's
punishment on reconviction. These reasons should be based upon
information which was not known to the sentencing authority dur-
ing the original sentencing proceeding. 181 If these reasons prove
176 See, e.g., Wasman, 468 U.S. at 572. Authorities supporting flexibility in sentencing
on retrial rely on four rationales: (1) a prior sentence has no legal existence because it
was imposed pursuant to a void conviction; (2) by utilizing a post-conviction remedy, the
defendant waived any benefit he may have had from a prior sentence; (3) the appellate
court has no authority to revise a sentence imposed by a trial court within statutory
limits; and (4) a new trial and sentence does not foreclose an independent consideration
of the sentence at a second trial. Alstyne, supra note 168, at 610-11.
177 See, e.g., supra note 176.
178 For further discussion of this balancing test, see infra note 192 and supra note 153
and accompanying text.
179 Id. See also Busic v. United States, 639 F.2d 940, 952 (3d Cir. 1981):
Balancing the defendant's right to a sentence not in excess of that prescribed by law
is the societal interest in punishing them when their guilt has been established. In-
herent in this societal interest is the fundamental principle that a convicted felon
should receive a sentence appropriate to the gravity of the offense and the character
and propensities of the offender.
180 Consider, for example, the fact that a trial court judge could sentence a defendant
vindictively even if his sentence were limited by an absolute prohibition on harsher re-
sentencing. The trial court judge could simply do so by imposing a greater sentence
than that which the defendant otherwise deserved in light of "new information" pro-
duced upon retrial.
181 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726; the extent of information not known to the original sen-
tencing authority could constitute the same information relied upon in the original sen-
tencing proceeding when different sentencing authorities are involved. The Pearce rule
would be inapplicable in these circumstances under McCullough, and the enhanced sen-
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satisfactory upon broad appellate review, the increased sentence
should be affirmed.
C. FEAR OF JUDICIAL VINDICTIVENESS: IS MCCULLOUGH THE BEST
ANSWER?
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent in McCullough, argued
that a broad construction of the Pearce rule cannot effectively relieve
defendants of fear of retaliatory or vindictive treatment on retrial. 
1 82
The dissent concluded that the possibility of receiving a more severe
sentence on reconviction unconstitutionally deters defendants from
appealing 8 3 their prior conviction and sentence.18 4 Accordingly,
the dissent advocates strict compliance with the Pearce rule require-
ments whenever the possibility of vindictiveness exists.
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to appeal their
prior conviction and sentence unimpeded by burdens imposed upon
that right by fear of judicial vindictiveness.18 5 To the same extent,
our criminal justice system has a legitimate interest in creating, in
the minds of appellants and potential appellants, an awareness that
if reconvicted they will incur punishment fully commensurate with
the seriousness of their offense and their potential for
rehabilitation. 1
8 6
In any discussion ofjudicial vindictiveness, the dispositive ques-
tion is not whether the risk of harsher resentencing will impair the
defendant's choice to appeal to an appreciable extent.187 As the
Court in McCullough clarified, the proper inquiry is whether there
exists a significant possibility of vindictiveness upon resentencing
that will effectively deter a reasonable defendant from exercising his
constitutional right to appeal.' 88 Thus, a legitimately imposed
tence, imposed upon the basis of no more information that that originally relied upon,
would pass muster. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
182 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 987 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
183 The term "appeal" is used here to mean either an appeal per se to the appellate
court following a conviction, or a collateral attack on the conviction through application
of a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court. It makes no difference which
route a defendant takes to obtain a new trial.
184 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 986 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725.
186 See id. at 738 (Black, J., concurring):
Those who have had former convictions set aside must, like all others who have had
been convicted, be sentenced according to the law, and a trial judge will normally
conduct a full inquiry into the background, disposition, and prospects for rehabilita-
tion of each defendant in order to set the appropriate sentence.
See also supra note 34.
187 See supra notes 122 & 124 and accompanying text.
188 See McCullough, 106 S. Ct. 976 (1986). See also supra note 104 and accompanying
text.
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higher sentence should not be struck down for creating an inciden-
tal chilling effect of minimal proportions. 8 9
1. The Gamble of Retrial.
No justification exists for completely insulating a defendant
from risks that are inherent in appealing a conviction and sen-
tence.' 90 The criminal justice system imposes many compelling
choices on defendants, each of which will deter the exercise of a
right.' 9 ' A potential appellant must constantly balance his interest
in the exercise of his rights-such as the right to choose his sen-
tencer and the right to appeal-with the risks he must face if he de-
cides to exercise that right.'
9 2
Justifying enhanced sentences on the basis of new information
neither infringes upon nor contracts a defendant's right to control
his own destiny on retrial.' 9 3 The Court's analysis in McCullough im-
plicitly recognized that a defendant always confronts a new spec-
trum of probabilities on retrial. As such, McCullough's decision to
appeal weighed the probability of reconviction and harsher resen-
tencing against the chances of an acquittal or a reduced sentence.
194
The risks that incriminating information could come to light and
189 To be constitutionally suspect, the hindrance of the right to appeal must be unrea-
sonable. The Court stated in Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966), that "once
established, these avenues [of appellate review] must be kept free of unreasoned distinc-
tions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts."
190 See Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). See, e.g., Rodgriguez, 375 F.2d at 716.
191 See, e.g., Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 31.
192 See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (A choice was available to the
defendant. That choice, essentially, was to either take the sure five year sentence first
offered, or to gamble on a higher sentence by choosing a jury trial to determine the
forgery charge and also prior convictions that might result in a sentence enhancement.);
Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183 (1971)(where a defendant unsuccessfully contended
that permitting jury to determine guilt and punishment in single trial compelled him to
waive his fifth amendment rights to remain silent in the guilt phase of the trial, whereas
in a bifurcated trial of guilt and punishment, defendant may remain silent in "guilt
trial," but argue for mitigating punishment during the punishment phase). See also
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
193 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 738 (Black, J., concurring). Although the chances of receiving a
more severe sentence upon reconviction are now greater under McCullough, the defend-
ant is still able to control his destiny by forgoing his right to obtain a new trial and
thereby incur the risk of which the defendant is aware. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721. Whether
the defendant is in fact entitled to greater protection from harsher resentencing is an
issue independent of the question whether a defendant is able to control his own destiny
on retrial. The Court is just as adverse to a policy, in which a defendant enjoys absolute
immunity from harsher resentencing, as the Court is to a policy in which a defendant is
assured a harsher sentence upon reconviction. Under McCullough, the defendant may be
exposed to a greater risk of harsher resentencing, but he is not condemned to it should
he elect to appeal. See id. at 722.
194 See, e.g., supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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subsequently compel a harsher resentence inhered in that
decision.' 9 5
In dealing with judicial vindictiveness, the Court has had to
weigh the importance of the general privilege conferred upon crimi-
nal appellants by the Pearce presumption of judicial vindictiveness
and its prophylactic rule, against the inroads of such a privilege on
the fair administration ofjustice.1 96 In its analysis, the Court in Mc-
Cullough adopted a public policy rationale within which the Pearce
presumption and its prophylactic rule are now circumscribed.
197
This policy reflects a desire to further the goals embraced in Pearce
in juxtaposition with what the Court in McCullough properly re-
garded as the equally significant concerns of a criminal justice sys-
tem in which deference to trial court sentencing discretion is a
fundamental means of assessing just penalties.' 98
2. The Gamble of Retrial: Summary
The Court in McCullough has struck, in the spirit of Wasman, a
practical balance between actions deemed to unconstitutionally chill
appeals and those actions that do not.1 99 This balance recognizes
that a residual "chilling effect" will always inhere in the legitimate
sanction of increased sentences on reconviction. 200 Apprehension
will exist as long as higher sentences may be imposed. This deter-
rent effect, however, is a product of a criminal justice system in
which difficult government imposed choices are inevitable.20' Since
a defendant's life and character significantly influence the outcome
of every criminal case, it will be difficult to limit these chilling effects
beyond McCullough without obstructing the imposition of an other-
wise well-reasoned and thoroughly considered sentence.
202
195 See, e.g., 395 U.S. at 738 (Black, J., concurring).
196 Similar balancing tests have been employed with respect to questions regarding
prosecutorial vindictiveness. See, e.g., Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 145 (5th Cir.
1978), quoted in United States v. Spence, 719 F.2d 358, 361-62 (11th Cir.
1983)("[W]here the circumstances show a realistic fear of vindictiveness ... the strength
of the presumption is determined by a balancing test which 'weigh[s] the need to give
defendants freedom to decide whether to appeal against the need to give the prosecu-
tion freedom to decide whether to prosecute.' ").
197 The effect of Pearce is tempered by the Court's reluctance to restrict the discretion-
ary authority of trial court judges unless judicial vindictiveness is sufficiently apparent.
See McCullough, 106 S. Ct. 976 (1986).
198 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
199 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 979.
200 Id. at 981.
201 See supra note 190.
202 McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 981. See also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249-50
(1949).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Court in McCullough deemed it proper, as it did in Wasman,
to reclarify and then redefine the essential thrust of Pearce. Accord-
ing to the Court's conclusions, public policy dictates that (1) a pre-
sumption of judicial vindictiveness only applies when a defendant
receives a more severes sentence on reconviction by the same sen-
tencing judge who imposed the defendant's original sentence;
(2) the Pearce rule should be construed to sanction harsher resen-
tencing on the basis of any new information obtained since the orig-
inal sentencing proceeding which bears a reasonable correlation to
the sentence increase; and (3) harsher resentencing should stand,
whether or not it in fact deters defendants from appealing their
prior conviction and sentence, in the absence of a presumption of
judicial vindictiveness or a showing of actual vindictiveness.
Under McCullough, those who choose to exercise the rights and
privileges which our Constitution and criminal justice system confer
may continue doing so without fear of penalty. The Court in McCul-
lough has preserved this protection for defendants while responding
to the equally significant concerns of our society in which sentenc-
ing discretion remains a vital and integral component of our crimi-
nal justice system.
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